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Two Interpretations of Immunity from Prejudgment
Attachment under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act
Two recent U.S. District Court decisions in Behring International,Inc.
v. Imperial Iran'an Air ForceI and Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian
Oil Co. 2 provide different interpretations as to the breadth of immunity
from prejudgment attachment granted by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 19763 to foreign governments doing business in the
United States. The FSIA codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity already adopted as the official policy of the Department of State
and applied by the U.S. courts. 4 It was expressly designed to transfer
from the Department of State to the courts the responsibility for determining whether a foreign state should be immune from liabilities arising
from its commercial activities in the United States. 5 To this end, the Act
established a comprehensive procedure for the maintenance of in personam actions against foreign states and their agencies. 6 Congress also
severely restricted the opportunity for foreign nations to claim immunity
from attachment in aid of execution upon a judgment entered by a U.S.
court. 7 In contrast with this expansion of domestic jurisdiction over a
foreign state, Congress also insulated to a considerable degree the property of foreign states from prejudgment attachment. 8 In Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, the Federal District Court of New
Jersey gave effect to an implied waiver of immunity from prejudgment
attachment contained in a 1955 commercial treaty between Iran and the
United States.9 Conversely, in Reading &Bates Corp. v. NationalIranian Oil
Co., the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
dictum, found this same alleged waiver of immunity to have been superseded by the FSIA.
1475

F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979).

2 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
4 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted th [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6604, 6605.
5 Id at 6605-06.
6 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1608 (1976).
7 Id §§ 1610(a)-1610(c).
8 Id. § 1610(d).
9 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, United States-Iran, Aug.
15, 1955, art. XI, para. 4, 8 U.S.T. 901, 909, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter cited as Treaty].
This treaty was considered to be in effect for the purpose of this litigation.
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In Behring, the New Jersey Federal District Court upheld the grant
of a temporary restraining order forbidding the removal of defendant's
property from plaintiffs warehouse.' 0 Later, the court authorized an
attachment of that property pending litigation between the parties."
Plaintiff Behring International, an international freight forwarding company, had contracted with the defendant, the Imperial Iranian Air Force
(IIAF), represented in the suit by the Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force
(IRIAF), 12 to transport purchased goods from the vendor's premises to
the plaintiffs warehouse. These goods were then prepared by the plaintiff for transport and taken to the place of shipment. In the spring of
1979, the government of the Shah of Iran was overthrown in a revolution
spearheaded by Islamic fundamentalists.1 3 As the turmoil of the revolution in Iran increased, shipments of goods in America went uncollected
and the IIAF refused to approve payments on invoices submitted by
Behring. 14 The IIAF closed its offices in New York and Behring officials
were forced to evacuate Iran. At this point Behring, claiming IIAF owed
it almost $400,000, found itself unable to communicate with IIAF officials in Tehran. 15 Behring therefore brought suit against the IIAF and
sought to attach the IIAF's goods that Behring held at its warehouses as
security for any judgment in its favor.
In determining whether a legal basis for this attachment existed, the
court was required to interpret the 1955 Treaty of Amity with Iran
within the framework of section 1610(d) of the FSIA which places limitations on prejudgment attachment. Section 1610(d) provides that the
property of a foreign state engaged in commercial activities in the United
States will be immune from prejudgment attachment unless:
(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment prior to judgment ...and
(2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment that has been or may ultimately be entered against the for-

eign state, and not to obtain jurisdiction.16
Section 1610 of the FSIA is qualified, however, by the savings clause
of section 1609 of the Act, which states that such immunity from prejudgment attachment is "subject to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party at the time of this Act."' 17 The district
court in Behring therefore was confronted with the task of interpreting
the breadth of the waiver of sovereign immunity in article XI, section 4
of the 1955 Treaty with Iran. If the treaty authorized prejudgment at1o

475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979).
11Id at 396.
12Id. at 386. As a result of the Iranian revolution, the Shah's Imperial Iranian Air Force
was reconstituted as the Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force. The latter appeared in this suit as
the successor to the Imperial Iranian Air Force.
13 TIME, Jan. 29, 1979, at 48.
14475 F. Supp. at 386.
15Id at 387.
16 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1976).
17Id § 1609.
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tachment, its language would prevail, under the savings clause of section
1609, over section 1610's grant of immunity from prejudgment attachment. This waiver stated:
No enterprise of either High Contracting Party, including corporations,
associations and government agencies and instrumentalities, which is
publicly owned or controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial, shipping or other business activities within the territories of the
other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself or its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution ofjudgment or other
hability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject
therein. 18

On the basis of this Treaty provision the district court was unable to
find that Iran had explicitly waived immunity from attachment before
entry ofjudgment as required by section 1610(d) of the FSIA. The court
asserted, however, that the parties' waiver of immunity from "other liability" contained in this paragraph of the Treaty, by implication, authorized attachment. 19 Article XI, section 4's express waiver of immunity
from taxation, suit, or execution of judgment, was meant to serve as an
illustration rather than an exclusive enumeration of agreed upon waivers.20 Therefore, the "or other liability" language was a general catch-all
and constituted a waiver of immunity from an attachment made for purposes other than taxation, suit, or execution of judgment. Specifically,
the district court held that prejudgment attachment fell into the category
of "other liability" for which Iran had waived immunity under article
XI, section 4.21
The court concluded that this waiver, though not express, was sufficiently clear to justify an order of attachment against the IIAF property
in the United States, provided New York's statutory requirements were
fulfilled. 22 In justifying its conclusion, the court noted that the savings
clause of section 1609 of the Act requires that prior international agreements be interpreted in their own right. Thus, the explicit waiver requirement of section 1610(d) could not be interpreted as requiring that
the Treaty contain an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment
attachment. Requiring the waiver of prejudgment attachment to be explicit in the Treaty with Iran would be, in the court's words, forcing the
parties "to anticipate the requirements of a law that will be passed
'23
twenty-one years later."
Two months after the Behring decision, in Reading & Bates Corp. v.
NationalIranian Oil Co. ,24 the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that the plaintiff, an American corpora18Treaty, supra note 9, art. XI, para. 4 (emphasis added).

19475 F. Supp. at 394-95.

20 Id.at 395.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id

24 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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tion, was not entitled to maintain a levy of attachment on $26 million of
Iranian funds in a New York bank. Reading & Bates Corporation had
originally leased an oil rig to the Oil Services Company, which was
under a service contract with the National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC). NIOC provided the funding for Oil Services Company. When
Reading & Bates Corporation did not receive payment on its invoices, it
filed a breach of contract suit against the NIOC. The complaint also
alleged that the NIOC had converted the leased rig by physically
preventing Reading & Bates representatives from inspecting it. In refusing to grant a prejudgment attachment on the Iranian funds, the court
held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that there was sufficient reason
to believe the defendant would remove its assets in order to avoid enagainst it, thus making prejudgment attachforcement of a judgment
25
ment unnecessary.
The attachment question was settled on these legal grounds, but the
court felt that in light of the recent decision in Behri'ng it was necessary to
address the question of the NIOC's immunity from prejudgment attachment under the FSIA. In dictum, the court concurred with the portion
of the Behring opinion holding that the "or other liability" language contained in article XI of the Treaty of Amity was not a sufficiently explicit
waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment to meet the stringent
explicit waiver standard of section 1610(d). The Reading & Bates court,
however, rejected the ruling in Behn'g that the general disclaimer of immunity in the Treaty constituted an enforceable waiver of immunity
from prejudgment attachment under the savings clause of section 1609 of
26
the FSIA.
The Reading &Bates court substantiated its decision on two grounds.
First, the court stressed that Congress had carefully circumscribed the
use of prejudgment attachment under the FSIA in order to preclude the
use of such attachments to harass a foreign defendant. Therefore, "in the
interest of consistent policy" rather than strict rules of construction, alleged waivers of immunity from prejudgment attachment that preceded
the Act should not be lightly implied, 27 but "should be explicit whether
it be by statute or by international agreement. ' 28 Second, the court
looked to the purposes of the 1955 Treaty with Iran to discern the intentions of the United States and Iran at the time of the agreement. From
this examination, the court concluded that neither party intended the
Treaty to subject either party to prejudgment attachment for security
purposes in suits brought by private citizens. To support its reading of
the parties' intent the court noted that prejudgment attachment is often
used to prevent a defendant from intentionally dissipating assets to avoid
at
at
Id at
Id at

25 Id
26 Id
27
28

727.

728-29.
728.
729.
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a potentially negative judgment. 29 Because prejudgment attachment is
used when the charging party does not trust the other side to meet its
legal obligations, the Reading court found it "hard to imagine that a sovereign nation, in entering a treaty supposedly to promote commerce,
evade a lawful judgwould at the same time even suggest that it would
'30
ment arising out of its commercial activities."
The courts in Behring and Reading & Bates relied on several considerations to arrive at their respective understandings of the interplay between sections 1609 and 1610(d) of the FSIA and the Treaty with Iran.
The Behring court asserted that standard statutory construction and the
apparent intention of Congress and the parties to the Treaty required a
finding that Iran had waived its immunity from prejudgment attachment. The Reading & Bates court perceived a contrary intention on the
part of Iran and the United States when they ratified the Treaty. Moreover, the Reading &Bates court maintained that congressional policy underlying the explicit waiver requirement in section 1610(d) should, for
the sake of consistency, also be read into the savings clause of section
1609. Thus, according to the Reading & Bates court, a waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment must be explicit to be effective, even
in international agreements enacted before the FSIA. A careful examination of congressional intent, principles of statutory construction, and
the intent of Iran and the United States in ratifying the Treaty supports
the reasoning and results of the Behrzng decision.
A strict statutory construction of section 1609 requires that the 1955
Treaty with Iran be interpreted in its own right without modification by
the subsequent language of the FSIA.3 1 Congressional intention underlying the savings clause of section 1609 was that any time a prior international agreement conflicted with the FSIA, the international agreement
would control.3 2 In this instance, the Treaty with Iran addressed the
issue of sovereign immunity and therefore, as the Behr'ng decision
noted,3 3 a reasonable reading of the Treaty should, under section 1609,
take precedence over section 1610(d) of the FSIA. Under this interpretation, the waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment would not
have to meet the explicit test of section 1610(d). If a reasonable interpretation of the "or other liability" language in article XI, section 4 of the
Treaty is that it includes an implied waiver of immunity from prejudgthat waiver should be binding on the two signatories
ment attachment,
34
to this Treaty.
29 Id at 726.
30 Id at 729.

31 1 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION § 32.06 (4th ed. 1972).
32 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprntedhn [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6616.
33 475 F. Supp. at 394.,
34 There may be an inherent weakness in the court's reasoning: Can an impted waiver of
immunity in fact be expressly in conflict with the Act's explicit waiver standard? The very nature of an implied assertion is that its meaning is gleaned from language that does not expressly
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Further support for the Behring decision can be found in the maxim
of treaty interpretation which holds that the true meaning of a treaty
should be determined as of the time it was concluded. 35 Under this standard construction, the terms of the Treaty with Iran should be defined
according to the meaning that the parties intended at the time of their
agreement. 36 The rationale underlying this approach is that any subsequent revision of the original meaning by one party without the mutual
agreement of both parties would frustrate the integrity and purpose of
the Treaty. Accordingly, the Behrzng court noted that it would be a distortion of the original understanding of Iran and the United States to
require the 1955 Treaty to conform to the legal changes embodied in the
1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 37 Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction and basic fairness, the FSIA's requirement in section
1610(d) of an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment
should not be superimposed on the Treaty with Iran. In other words, if
the United States and Iran intended in the Treaty to waive immunity
from prejudgment attachment without explicitly so providing, the requirement in the FSIA that a waiver of immunity from prejudgment
attachment be explicit cannot be applied to the Treaty.
In Behrzng, the defendant urged the court to interpret the language
of article XI, section 4 waiving "immunity therein from taxation, suit,
[and] execution ofjudgment" as an exclusive list of waivers of immunity,
thus rendering the "or other liability" language superfluous.

38

The de-

fendant's construction of the Treaty appears to be based on the traditional principle of expressi'o uni'us est exc/usio alterius.3 9 This principle
provides that if a statute or treaty specifies one or more exceptions to a
general rule any other non-stated exceptions are excluded. 40 The Behrng
court determined that this principle of construction did not apply because the specific waivers of immunity from taxation, suit, and execution
of judgment of article XI, section 4 were simply illustrations of some
waivers of immunity and additional waivers of immunity were to be implied from the "or other liability" clause. 4 1 By including the "or other
liability" language in the Treaty, the parties provided for exceptions to
immunity other than those expressly identified. The presence of the genarticulate that assertion. Arguably then, an implied agreement on the question of prejudgment
attachment is not the "manifest" conflict that Congress stipulated as the only occasion when a
prior international agreement would control. Such a position, however, would elevate a technical reading of the language over the substance of congressional intent expressed in the savings
clause of section 1609. If the parties to the Treaty agreed to be amenable to prejudgment
attachment, as the Behring court found, a faithful reading of Congress' intentions under section
1609 requires that the Treaty provisions override section 1610(d).
35 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (6th ed. 1976).
36 A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 467 (1961).

37 475 F. Supp. at 394.
38 Id. at 395.

39 "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACKs's LAW DICTIONARY 521
(5th ed. 1979).
40 Id
41 475 F. Supp. at 395.
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eral catch-all, "or other liability," made the application of the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius inappropriate here.
As a practical matter, the 1955 Treaty of Amity with Iran is not well
suited to an interpretation that gives effect only to specifically identified
and described terms and construes the language outside the context of
the Treaty as a whole. In the hearings on the Treaty with Iran in the
Foreign Relations Committee, the Department of State spokesman
stated that there was a tendency for the Department to negotiate shorter,
less specific forms of commercial treaties with underindustrialized nations like Iran. 42 Consequently, the 1955 Treaty is phrased in general
terms as reflected by the Treaty's waiver of immunity from not only specific legal processes like suit and execution of judgment but also from the
ambiguous "or other liability to which privately owned and controlled
enterprises are subject therein."'4 3 Since there is no clear explication of
the meaning of the "or other liability" clause, this language best can be
interpreted only by reference to the probable intentions of the parties as
44
reflected in the instrument as a whole.
The historical context in which the Treaty was negotiated is important in determining the intentions of the parties. In the 1940's and
1950's, the Department of State negotiated fourteen Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties with various nations, including the
Treaty with Iran. 45 Each of these treaties contained almost identical
provisions obligating both contracting parties to waive sovereign immunity for state-controlled enterprises engaged in business activities within
the territory of the other party. This comprehensive series of treaties coincided with the rise of state participation in commercial activities, both
42 Commercial Treaties with Iran, Nicaraguaand the Netherlands., Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1956) (statement of Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State).
43 Treaty, supra note 9, art. XI, para. 4.
44 "The typical U.S. commercial treaty of the group here under consideration has been
developed as an integrated document, and the sovereign immunity provision may not properly
be separated from the general context of the instrument." Setser, The Immunity Waiverfor State-

ControlledBusiness Enterprises in United States Commercial Treaties, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 93 (1961).

45 The article and paragraph of the immunity waiver in each of the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties follow the citation:
United States-Ireland, 1951, 1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155, art. XVIII, para. 2;
United States-Greece, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057, art. XIV, para. 5;
United States-Israel, 1951, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948, art. XVIII, para. 3;
United States-Denmark, 1951, 12 U.S.T.908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797, art. XVIII, para.
3; United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No.
3593, art. XVIII, para. 2; United States-Iran, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No.
3853, art. XI, para. 4; United States-Nicaragua, 1956, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No.
4024, art. XVIII, para. 3; United States-Netherlands, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 2043,
T.I.A.S. No. 3942, art. XVIII, para. 2; United States-Korea, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 2217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3947, art. XVIII, para. 2; United States-Italy, 1948, 63 Stat. 2225,
T.I.A.S. No. 1965, art. XXIV, para. 6; United States-Uruguay, 1950, not in force,
S. Exec. 0., 81st Cong., 2d Sess., art. XVIII, para. 5; United States-Haiti, 1955,
not in force, S. Exec. H., 84th Cong., IstSess., art. XVIII, para. 2; United StatesColumbia, 1951, not in force, S. Exec. M., 82d Cong., 1st Sess., art. XVIII, para.
2.
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in the Soviet bloc and, to a lesser extent, in Western Europe.' 6 The
transformation in international business wrought by this development
created concern in the State Department that traditional sovereign immunity principles would permit foreign states and their instrumentalities
47
to escape liability for their commercial activities in the United States.
In part as a response to this perceived threat, the State Department issued the famous Tate Letter in 1952, advising the Attorney General that
the Department of State was adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity which recognized the immunity of a sovereign with regard to
its sovereign acts but not for its private, commercial acts. 48 Since then,
foreign states have been officially on notice that they would be subject to
disputes concerning their comU.S. jurisdiction for the adjudication of
49
mercial activities in the United States.
Article XI, section 4 of the Treaty with Iran must be read in the
context of this concerted effort by the Department of State to expand the
liability of foreign nations doing business in the United States. The provisions of the Treaty concerning the waiver of sovereign immunity went
considerably beyond the dictates of the Tate Letter, which denied immunity only for the private, commercial activity of sovereign governments,
and, in fact, went further in reducing the scope of sovereign immunity
than many supporters of the restrictive theory had advocated. 50 In essence, the commercial portion of the Treaty guaranteed that each Party
51
would receive national treatment for its investments in the other State.
46 Setser, supra note 44, at 91-92.
47 Id.
48 26 DEP'T OF STATE BULLETIN 984-85 (1952).

The Tate Letter was the first formal

declaration that the Department of State was adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity recognized by a growing number of nations. From that time on, the State Department
would not grant requests from foreign governments for a ruling that they were immune from
suit arising from a particular commercial activity.
49 The development of the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity up to the time of the
FSIA has been inconsistent and confused. Prior to the Tate Letter, judicial deference to suggestions of immunity by the State Department were justified, in dictum, as required by Constitutional separation of powers. Immunity questions were considered as part of executive branch
foreign relations responsibilities. See Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d
1198 (2d Cir. 1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
Judicial deferences to State Department rulings on sovereign immunity reached their peak
in Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) and Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). In the
latter, the court held that the ruling tribunal must immediately inquire whether the ground of
immunity is one which the established policy of the Department of State is to recognize. 324
U.S. at 36.
The Department of State continued to play a role in sovereign immunity determinations
after the Tate Letter and the FSIA was enacted to end the confusion and inequity that resulted
from that process. Seegenerall 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429 (1977).
50 Setser, supra note 44, at 99.
51 FNC treaties traditionally have contained so-called establishment provisions
dealing more or less with these three elements: the right of citizens of each country to establish and carry on business activities within the other and to receive due
protection there for their persons and property. . . . The basic rule to govern
the conduct of such activities has long since been settled, in United States treaty
practice, as "national treatment": that is, equality of treatment as between the
alien and the citizen of the country.
Walker, Treatiesfor tAr Enouragementand Protectionof Foreign Investment: Present United States Praclice, 5 AM. J. CoMp. L. 229, 232 (1956).
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Article III, section 2 provides that:
Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall have
freedom of access to the courts of justice in the territories of the other.
Such access shall be allowed, in any event, upon terms no less favorable
of such other High
than those applicable to nationals and companies
52
Contracting Party or any other third country.

When this provision is read in conjunction with article XI, section 4, it is
clear that under this national treatment standard prejudgment attachment, which is a legitimate procedural device in U.S. courts, would not
be denied an Iranian plaintiff suing in U.S. state or federal courts. Similarly, the Iranian government and its agencies must expect to be subject
to prejudgment attachment for their commercial activities in the United
States.
Even if interpreted out of the context of the Treaty as a whole, the
language of article XI, section 4 still appears to substantiate the conclusion in Behrzng that the waiver of immunity from "other liability" included a waiver from prejudgment attachment. Article XI, section 4
provides that state-controlled enterprises of either nation waived immunity from suit, taxation, execution of judgment, or other liability "to
which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein."
Neither defendant in Behring or Reading & Bates contended that a private
Iranian venture doing business in the United States would not be subject
to the full panoply of U.S. jurisdiction and procedure, including prejudgment attachment. Article XI's association of liability of state-operated
enterprises with private enterprises indicates the waiver of "other liability" applied to prejudgment attachment. One of the State Department
officials responsible for negotiating these Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation treaties observed that the intention of the waiver provision
was "obviously to equate the economic unit when it comes within the
control of the State completely with the53private enterprise as concerns
liabilities and burdens imposed by law."
Ironically, the comprehensive scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity in the 1955 Treaty proved too broad even for the State Department. The policy of including these waiver provisions in Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation treaties was discontinued in 1958.54 Evidently, the State Department felt that sweeping waivers undermined the
ability of the U.S. government to employ the defense of sovereign immunity in suits in foreign courts against the United States. 55 The fact that
the State Department subsequently found the waivers of immunity in
these treaties to be too broad and inclusive suggests that the waiver from
judicial process in the Treaty with Iran was far ranging. If the Treaty
was this broad, it is even more plausible to interpret article XI, section 4
as impliedly waiving sovereign immunity from prejudgment attachment.
52 Treaty, supra note 9, art. III, para. 2.
53 Setser, supra note 44, at 99; see also Wilson, A Decade ofVew Commercial Treattes, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 927 (1956).
54 Setser, supra note 44, at 90.
55 Id

N.C.J.
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In denying prejudgment attachment, the Reading & Bates court was
responding to an apparent congressional concern that prejudgment attachment might be used as a weapon by private plaintiffs to harass foreign states engaged in commercial activities in the United States. 56 The
court undoubtedly was also aware of the Supreme Court's admonitions
in recent cases against unwarranted attachments of a defendant's property. 57 Prejudgment attachment of a defendant's property may secure
payment of a potential award, but it may also prevent the defendant
from making full use of those attached assets during the course of the
litigation. 58 When the defendant is a foreign enterprise with its main
base of operations in another country, the harassment potential of such
an attachment is exacerbated. A foreign defendant having little connection with the forum state may thus be coerced to settle out of court when
it might not otherwise have done so. These concerns underlie the district
court's dictum in Reading & Bates that the NIOC should not be subject
under the Treaty with Iran to a levy of attachment on its U.S. funds.
The protection rationale of the Reading & Bates court is at least partially obviated by recent developments in U.S. law in the area of pre59
judgment attachment. The Supreme Court ruled in Fuentes v. Shevin
that a defendant must be accorded the procedural due process requirements of notice and prior hearing before his property can be attached
under a prejudgment attachment statute. This constitutional protection
makes the use of prejudgment attachments qualitatively different from
the old practice of attachment for the sake of jurisdiction that existed
prior to the enactment of the FSIA. Now a state-controlled foreign enterprise has some assurance that in most cases its property will be attached prior to judgment only when the plaintiff is likely to prevail on
the merits of the underlying claim 6° and when there is reason to believe
that assets necessary to satisfy a judgment will be removed from the jurisdiction by the defendant. 6 1 With these safeguards, courts can give effect
to the savings clause of section 1609 and uphold prior international
agreements implicitly waiving immunity from prejudgment attachment
without interfering with the policy against using prejudgment attachment to harass a foreign sovereign that underlies the explicit waiver standards of section 1610.62
56 478 F. Supp. at 728.
57 See generally North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuen-

tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1967).
58 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1017, 1017 (1978).

59 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
60 See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concur-

ring).
61 For examples of New York case law on this point, see Incontrade, Inc. v. Oilborn Int.,
S.A., 407 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Eliot v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 11 Misc. 2d

133, 171 N.Y.S.2d 217 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957), aft'd, II Misc. 2d 136, 179 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct.
1958) (per curiam). See also Kheel, New York's Amended Attachment Statute. A Prejudgment Remedy in
Need of FurtherRevision, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 199 (1978).
62 Setser, supra note 44, at 120.
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In any event, foreign policy concerns, such as the ill will that prejudgment attachment of a foreign state's assets might engender, should
not affect a court's interpretation of the FSIA as it did in Reading & Bates.
Congress made it clear that the passage of this Act was intended to eliminate politically motivated determinations of sovereign immunity by
transferring that decision-making power from the executive to the judiciary. 6 3 In transferring the exclusive authority to decide sovereign immunity questions to the courts, Congress elected to sacrifice some degree of
political pragmatism in favor of due process considerations and at the
same time insulate the foreign policy bodies of the executive branch from
the diplomatic pressures that had influenced its recommendations on
sovereign immunity questions to the courts in the past.6 4 In view of this
specific congressional directive, U.S. courts should determine alleged
waivers of immunity from prejudgment attachment that preceded the
FSIA in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of the
waiver. To do otherwise would frustrate the original intentions of the
contracting states and distort the articulated purpose and policy upon
which the FSIA rests.
Individuals and corporations preparing to do business in the United
States with agents of foreign countries are forewarned of the parameters
of foreign sovereign immunity for commercial activities under the FSIA.
A U.S. corporation that feels the foreign state with which it is dealing is
unreliable can seek an explicit waiver of immunity from prejudgment
attachment sufficient to meet the requirements of section 1610(d). U.S.
businesses engaging in commerce with foreign states under international
agreements concluded prior to the FSIA, however, do not have this opportunity to conform their contractual relations to the requirements of
section 1610(d). It was partially to protect these enterprises that Con65
gress inserted the savings clause, section 1609, into the FSIA.
The 1979 revolution in Iran, which precipitated the Behnhg and
Reading & Bates cases, illustrates the exigencies which may occur in commercial transactions with a foreign state, even when the transactions are
consummated within the borders of the United States. The Iranian situation supports the contention that some form of prejudgment attachment is necessary to prevent foreign states from withdrawing their U.S.
assets in anticipation of judgments against them. 66 The savings clause of
section 1609 makes it clear that courts should not be reticent to find preFSIA waivers of immunity from prejudgment attachment if the evidence
63 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 436 (1977).

64 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, repnwtzedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6604, 6605-06.

65 Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 394 (D.N.J.
1979). Seealso H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 26 repnhted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6616, 6625, stating the general purpose and objectives of the savings
clauses of the FSIA.
66 In December 1977, Congress passed the International Emergency Economic Powers
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demonstrates that such a waiver was contemplated in the original agreement between the parties.
-SCOTT MEZA
Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). This Act provides that the President may
declare a national emergency when the United States is faced with any unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security, foreign policy, or economy. When the President declares
such an emergency, section 1702 grants him the power to control the disposition by any person
subject to U.S. jurisdiction of any property in which a foreign country or national thereof has an
interest.
In November 1979, President Carter, under the authority of this Act, issued an Executive
Order blocking the assets of the Government of Iran or its instrumentalities or controlled entities. Under the implementing regulations of that Executive Order, the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, transactions in property under U.S. jurisdiction or control in which Iran or its
instrumentalities have an interest are prohibited without a license from the Treasury Department. 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.101-.904 (1980). Specifically, § 535.504 provided that:
(a) subject to the limitations of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, judicial
proceedings are authorized with respect to property in which on or since the effective date there has existed an interest of Iran or an Iranian entity.
Subsection (d) provided that "[piroperty transferred into or held in the United States by Iran or
an Iranian entity under a specific license which by its terms withdraws the authorization for
prejudgment attachment with respect to such property is excluded from the privilege of paragraph (a) of this section.
A subsequent addition to these regulations codified at § 31 C.F.R. 535.418 provides that:
The general authorization for judicial proceedings contained in § 535.504(a) includes prejudgment attachment. However, § 535.504(a) does not authorize payment or delivery of any blocked property to any court, marshall, sheriff, or similar
entity, and any such transfer of blocked property is property is prohibited without
a specific license. It would not be consistent with licensing policy to issue such a
license.
In E-Systems, Inc. v.Islamic Repubicr of/ran, 491 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1980), an American manufacturer sought a prejudgment attachment against two aircraft, other related assets
and a "blocked account" representing a contingent liability of the plaintiff to an Iranian bank.
The district court did not find an implied waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment in
the "or other liability" language in article XI, section 4 of the Treaty with Iran. The court
reached this conclusion in part because of the general perception in this area that waivers of
foreign sovereign immunity ought not to be lightly implied. The court felt that because foreign
sovereign immunity existed at the time of the ratification of the Treaty, it was therefore unreasonable to infer from less than exact language that the signatories intended to allow the assets of
their commercial enterprises to be subject to prejudgment attachment. Therefore, on this point
the court followed the Reading & Bates decision in requiring an explicit waiver of prejudgment
attachment.
In E-Systems, however, the court also ruled that neither § 535.504 nor § 535.418 were intended to overrule the provisions in the FSIA concerning prejudgment attachment. Only an
express statement in these regulations to that effect would abrogate those provisions. Therefore,
the court reasoned, the privilege of immunity from prejudgment attachment granted by section
1610 continued to exist unless Iran had expressly waived that immunity in the Treaty. The
court found no such express waiver by Iran.
In New EnglandMerchants NationalBank v.IranianPower Generationand Transmission Co., 502 F.
Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the same court that decided Reading & Bates disagreed with the
court's reasoning in E-ystems on the effect of these regulations. The court in New England
Merchants maintained that the Treasury Regulations must be read in conjunction with the Executive Order invoking the powers of the Emergency Powers Act: "[W]hen this is done, there
can be no doubt that the President intended, and the regulations expressly permit, that Iranian
assets are no longer entitled to the privilege of immunity and thus, are subject to prejudgment
attachment." Id. at 131. While permitting the prejudgment attachments on this ground, the
court did uphold its earlier ruling in Reading & Bates that neither the United States nor Iran
intended the words "or other liability" in article XI, section 4 of the Treaty with Iran to include
a waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment.

